Risk Aversion and Dynamic Games Between Hydroelectric Operators under Uncertainty by Abbassi, Abdessalem et al.
 
 
Centre de Recherche en économie de 
l’Environnement, de l’Agroalimentaire, des 
Transports et de l’Énergie 
Center for Research on the economics of the 
Environment, Agri-food, Transports and 
Energy 
 
_______________________ 
Abbassi: Corresponding author. Faculty of Economics and Management of Nabeul, University of Carthage, 
Tunisia and CREATE 
abbassi.abdessalem@gmail.com 
Dakhlaoui: Industrial Economics Department, Polytechnic School of Tunisia, LEGI, Faculty of Economics 
and Management of Nabeul, University of Carthage, Tunisia 
ahlem.dakhlaoui2@gmail.com 
Tamini: Department of Agricultural Economics and Consumer Science, Université Laval, and CREATE 
lota.tamini@eac.ulaval.ca 
 
Les cahiers de recherche du CREATE ne font pas l’objet d’un processus d’évaluation par les pairs/CREATE 
working papers do not undergo a peer review process. 
 
ISSN 1927-5544 
 
 
 
Risk Aversion and Dynamic Games Between Hydroelectric 
Operators under Uncertainty 
  
Abdessalem Abbassi 
Ahlem Dakhlaoui 
Lota D. Tamini 
 
 
Cahier de recherche/Working Paper 2014-4 
 
Juin/June 2014 
 
  
Abstract: This article analyses management of hydropower dams within monopolistic and 
oligopolistic competition and when hydroelectricity producers are risk averse and face demand 
uncertainty. In each type of market structure we analytically determine the water release path 
in closed-loop equilibrium. We show how a monopoly can manage its hydropower dams by 
additional pumping or storage depending on the relative abundance of water between different 
regions to smooth the effect of uncertainty on electricity prices. In the oligopolistic case with 
symmetric risk aversion coefficient, we determine the conditions under which the relative 
scarcity (abundance) of water in the dam of a hydroelectric operator can favor additional 
strategic pumping (storage) in its competitor’s dams. When there is asymmetry of the risk 
aversion coefficient, the firm’s hydroelectricity production increases as its competitor’s risk 
aversion increases, if and only if the average recharge speed of the competitor’s dam exceeds a 
certain threshold, which is an increasing function of its average water inflows. 
 
Keywords: Closed-loop Cournot competition, electricity wholesale market, hydropower dams, 
demand uncertainty, asymmetric risk aversion 
 
JEL Classification: L94, Q25, C61, C73 
 
Résumé: Cet article traite de la gestion des barrages réservoirs sous deux structures 
industrielles différentes : monopolistique et oligopolistique. Les producteurs hydroélectriques 
sont averses au risque et font face à de l’incertitude sur la demande. Nous déterminons 
analytiquement le sentier de prélèvement de l’eau à l’équilibre en boucle fermée. Nous 
montrons comment le monopole gère son parc hydroélectrique par pompage ou stockage 
supplémentaire en fonction de l’abondance relative de l’eau entre les différentes régions afin de 
lisser l’effet de l’incertitude sur le prix de l’électricité. Dans le cas oligopolistique à taux 
d’aversion au risque symétrique, nous déterminons les conditions sous lesquelles la rareté 
(abondance) relative de l’eau dans le barrage d’un opérateur hydroélectrique favorise un 
pompage (stockage) stratégique supplémentaire sur les barrages de ses concurrents. Lorsqu’il y 
a asymétrie du coefficient d’aversion au risque, la production hydroélectrique d’une firme 
augmente au fur et à mesure que l’aversion au risque de son concurrent augmente si et 
seulement si la moyenne de la vitesse de remplissage du barrage de son concurrent dépasse un 
certain seuil qui est une fonction croissante de la moyenne de ses flux de recharge. 
 
Mots clés : Jeu à la Cournot en boucle fermée, marché de gros de l’électricité, les barrages 
réservoirs, incertitude de la demande, asymétrie d’aversion au risque 
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1 Introduction 
In 2012, hydroelectricity supplied 16.3% of world electricity; growth has occurred almost all over 
the world (IPCC 2014).
1
 Countries where hydroelectricity is the main source of electricity are 
Norway, at 98%, Brazil, at 97%, the Province of Quebec, Canada, at 90%, and New Zealand, at 
80% (Cramps and Moreaux, 2001). Because of climate change, the contribution of 
hydroelectricity to world electricity is expected to grow. Indeed, decarbonizing (i.e. reducing the 
carbon intensity) electricity generation is a key component of cost‐effective mitigation strategies 
intended to stabilize temperatures.  In most integrated modelling scenarios, decarbonizing 
happens more rapidly in electricity generation than in the industrial, buildings, and transport 
sectors (IPCC, 2014). This will lead to the growth of renewable energy including hydropower.
2
 
Nonetheless, the economic literature has mainly analyzed the strategic behavior of electricity 
operators on the wholesale electricity market in purely thermal systems or mixed hydrothermal 
systems.
3
 Purely hydroelectric industries with large water storage capacities have attracted little 
attention.  
Ambec and Doucet (2002) examined the problem of managing run of river hydropower dams 
under a monopolistic and oligopolistic structure when water inflows are deterministic. They used 
a two-period model to show that the absence of a water market during hydroelectric production 
can engender two sources of loss of social welfare: suboptimal management of water resources 
and the exercise of market power. Van Ackere and Ochoa (2010) used a stylized deterministic 
simulation model to evaluate the impact of the liberalization of the hydroelectric industry on the 
                                                 
1
 The share of renewables in global electricity generation approached 21% in 2012 (Enerdata, 2013), making 
renewables the third largest contributor to global electricity production, just behind coal and gas. IPCC (2014) 
expects that renewable energy will become the second‐largest contributor before 2020.  Renewable energy includes 
bioenergy, direct solar energy, geothermal energy, hydropower, ocean energy, and wind energy (IPCC, 2014). 
2
 Nonetheless, as Fischedick et al. (2011) contends, the long‐term percentage contribution of some individual 
renewable energy sources (e.g., hydropower, bioenergy, and ocean energy) to climate change mitigation may be 
limited by the available technical potential in countries where deep reductions in GHG emissions are sought. 
3
 Examples are Scott and Read (1996), Von der Fehr and Sandsbraten (1997), Buschnell (1998), Crampes and 
Moreaux (2001), Garcia et al. (2001), Chaton and Doucet (2003), Dakhlaoui and Moreaux (2004), Gen and Thille 
(2011). 
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quantity and price of electricity produced. They show that total electricity production is clearly 
lower in a non-liberalized market. Haddad (2011) developed a two-period model that 
characterizes the effects of deterministic seasonal water inflows on storage capacity optimal 
water management. 
Nonetheless, the works above have not integrated the risk dimension, which is quite salient for 
suppliers of electricity from hydraulic structures. Water reserves are renewed randomly by 
precipitation. Thus, in the extreme case that precipitation is zero. The water stock is a temporarily 
finite resource because using a unit of water stored in the dam would constitute one unit less for 
the following period. Given the climate change phenomenon and the associated series of extreme 
events (IPCC, 2014), the challenge of optimal management of this resource over several periods 
of time has become more pressing.  
On the demand side, operators of hydroelectric plants are also facing several sources of 
uncertainty closely linked to different categories of electricity consumers. Residential demand 
strongly depends on climate conditions, which determine the intensity of use of home appliances, 
along with electricity prices (Reiss and White, 2005; Dergiades and Tsoulfidis, 2008). In contrast, 
commercial and industrial demand is strongly associated with economic conditions, and some 
macroeconomic policy changes (Dilaver and Hunt, 2011). Electricity demand (residential, 
industrial and commercial) therefore fluctuates over the short term, and operators may find it 
difficult to smooth prices (Genc and Thille, 2012). Climate change may also exacerbate water and 
energy tensions across sectors and regions, potentially impacting hydropower (either positively or 
negatively, depending on whether the potential climate‐adaptation benefits of hydropower 
facilities are realized) and on other technologies that require water (Arent et al., 2011; Cisneros 
and Oki, 2014). Overall, fluctuations in water reserves between different hydroelectric sites 
coupled with electricity demand uncertainty may favor strategic behavior by hydroelectric 
operators in the harnessing of this potential energy.   
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Philpott et al. (2013) consider this dimension of risk in their analysis and show that risk hedging 
instruments can reduce losses of welfare associated with the presence of electricity supply 
uncertainty. However, these authors focus on equilibrium on a competitive market.
4
 Garcia et al. 
(2001), Dakhlaoui and Moreaux (2004) and Genc and Thille (2011) explored the implications of 
imperfect competition on electricity markets. To the best of our knowledge, analytical works that 
examined imperfect competition when uncertainty is present did not consider hydropower 
producers’ risk aversion. Yet as the IPCC (2014) argues, good knowledge of how various market 
structures operate is needed for enlightened decision making on arbitrage between different 
sources of energy.    
In this paper, we analyze the behavior of hydropower producers that are risk averse and face 
electricity demand uncertainty. To do so, we develop a dynamic model in which the hydroelectric 
park comprise multiple mountain reservoir-type dams, and posit two different industrial structures: 
monopolistic and oligopolistic.
5
 We analytically determine the water release path at closed-loop 
equilibrium. We show how a monopoly manages hydropower reservoirs by additional pumping or 
storing depending on the relative abundance of water between different regions to smooth the effect 
of demand uncertainty. In addition, risk aversion reduces variance of water pumping when the net 
flow of precipitation is either positive or negative. In the duopolistic case with symmetric risk 
aversion, we determine the conditions under which the relative scarcity (abundance) of water in an 
operator’s dam can favor strategic additional pumping (storage) at the competitor’s dams. In the 
case of a duopoly with asymmetric aversion rates, we show that a firm’s hydroelectric production 
increases in parallel with its competitor’s risk aversion, if and only if the average recharge speed of 
the competitor’s dam exceeds a certain threshold that increasingly depends on the average water 
inflows.   
                                                 
4
 Philpott and Guan (2013) empirically analyze social welfare following the opening of a wholesale electricity market 
in New Zealand when the social planner is risk averse about uncertainty of water inflows. Aslo see Genc and Sen 
(2008) for an empirical analysis. 
5
 Deregulation processes have engendered several market structures. The industry is ranked according to four models 
based on the degree of competition: vertically integrated monopoly, single buyer, competition on the wholesale 
electricity market and competition on the retail market (Hunt, 2002). 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the dynamic and stochastic model 
of management of hydroelectric park with multiple dams. Section 3 analyzes the situation of a 
monopoly. Section 4 covers the case where dams are managed by oligopolies with asymmetric 
attitude toward risk, whereas Section 5 examines the case of risk asymmetry. The last section 
concludes the paper.   
2 Model 
Electricity demand  
Demand in period t  is represented by an inverse demand function of linear form (Genc and 
Thille, 2012): 
t t tp a bQ    (1) 
where tp  represents the price of electricity, tQ  the quantity demanded, b  is a positive constant 
and the parameter ta  is normally distributed with an expectation of a  and a variance of 
2 . 
Electricity production  
Let us define by itq  the electricity production of dam i  1, ,i n  at time t and such that total 
electricity and production of different dams (
1
n
t it
i
Q q

 ) is totally consumed.
6
 Each facility i  
uses water stored in a hydropower dam of region i , denoted by its . Without lost of generality, we 
assume that each unit released from the dam allows free generation of one unit of electricity. The 
dam of region i  is regularly recharged by random flows of precipitation itf , which follow a 
                                                 
6
 To simplify the example, we assume that we never encounter the power transmission capacity constraint. Head loss 
during transmission is also ignored. 
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random walk where  it iE f F  with 0iF  .
7
  The evolution of the water available in the dam in 
region i  is governed by the following recurrent equation on the dynamics of the stock: 
1
1 1 1 2
it it it it
it it it it
q f s s
q f s s

   
  
  
         (2)       
Hydropower producer’s objective function  
At the start of each period t , the hydropower operator observes its , the water available in region i
, with certainty. He then decides on production itq  which maximizes the discounted sum of 
expected utilities of the profit from operation of all hydropower facilities while meeting the n  
dynamic stochastic constraints on the evolution of water in various dams.  
We assume that the cost of storage is a quadratic
8
 function of the difference between the current 
stock,
its , and future storage at the end of period 1t  , 1its  . In other words, the electricity 
producer must have a stable stock in each dam to avoid negative externalities on other activities 
around the dam (agriculture, drinking water supply, recreational activities, etc.) or cause flooding 
during periods of high water levels. In the case where the future stock fluctuates above or below 
the current stock, the hydropower operator must pay a penalty equal to  
2
1
2
it its s

  for each 
hydropower dam, with 0  . The operator’s instantaneous profit at period t  is written as the 
difference between total revenues  tRT and the cost of storage in n reservoirs: 
 
2
, , 1
1 2
n
t t i t i t
i
RT s s

 

        (3) 
                                                 
7
  Garcia et al. (2001) assume that natural filling of a dam follows a binomial distribution, whereas Genc and Thille 
(2011) assume a normal distribution. In general, hydrologists posit a Markovian process (Karamous and Vasiliadis, 
1992; Faber and Stedinger, 2001). 
8
  Dakhlaoui and Moreaux (2004) presumed that the storage cost is a quadratic function of the difference between the 
current stock, its , and an exogenous target storage s

.  
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At each period t , the hydroelectric operator maximizes the expected utility of its  mean-variance 
type profit, characterized by constant absolute risk aversion:  
       / 2t t tW E A Var         (4) 
where 
U
A
U

 

 is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of constant absolute risk aversion. 
3 Dam management under a monopolistic structure  
We assume an electricity industry with a monopolistic structure. Using the demand function 
defined by (1) and the profit function given by (3), the operator’s objective function defined by 
(4) is:  
       
2 22 2
, , 1 , , 1
1 1
/ 2
2 2
n n
t t t t i t i t t t t i t i t
i i
W E a Q bQ s s A Var a Q bQ s s
 
  
 
   
          
   
  (5) 
By assuming that the precipitation inflows to the different hydropower dams are independent, we 
can therefore write equation (5) as:   
     
22 2 2
, , 1
1
/ 2
2
n
t t t t i t i t t
i
W aQ bQ E s s A Q

 

      (6) 
The monopoly chooses the electricity production path   1,...,
1,...,
i nit
t
q 
 
 by n hydropower dams as a 
solution to the dynamic and stochastic optimization problem with an infinite horizon. The 
solution to the optimization problem of hydroelectric operator itq  is (see Technical Appendix A1):   
   
2
2 2
1
2
2 2
n
it i i
i
a b A
q F F
n b A n b A

    

  
   
  (7) 
Based on (7) and the dynamic equation of stocks given by the expression in (2), the solution to 
the variation in stock in the hydropower dam in region i is: 
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   
2
, 1 2 2
1
2
2 2
n
i t it it i
i
a b A
s q f F
n b A n b A

   



      
   
  (8) 
and total production of the monopoly is: 
   2 2 12 2
n
M
t i
i
na
Q F
n b A n b A

    
 
   
   (9) 
3.1 Case of abundance of water in region i and shortage in region j 
In this case, there is an increase in the average precipitation inflows in region i ( 0iF  ), and an 
average decrease in flows in region j ( 0jF  ). The average flow is presumed constant in regions 
other than i and j.  
We assume that the gap between the variation of the rate of refilling of dam i and that of dam j is 
written as:
j iF F      with j iF F    . The total effect of fluctuations in water inflows in 
the two regions on production by the power plant of region i  itq  is:  
 
 
2
2
2
0
2
it i
b A
q F
n b A
 
 

    
 
 (10)  
The operator must therefore perform additional pumping from the dam of the region with 
abundant water and additional storage in the dam in the region with scarce water. The total 
impact of fluctuations in water inflows in the two regions i and j on production by the dam of 
region j is: 
 
 
2
2
2
0
2
jt j
b A
q F
n b A
 
 

    
 
 (11) 
Further, variation in total production of the two dams  Mt it jtQ q q     is:  
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  
 
2
2
2 2
2
M
t
n b A
Q
n b A
 

 
  
 
 
 (12) 
The variation in total production of the two dams depends on the sign of  . If 0jF    , that is 
i jF F   , then 0
M
tQ  , and if 0 iF    that is i jF F    then 0
M
tQ  . Given 
expressions (10) and (11), the impact of fluctuations of recharge flows on the amount of water 
available in the hydropower dam in region j is identical to that observed in region i: 
 
 
 
2
, 1 , 1 2
2
2
j t i t
b A
d s d s
n b A
 
 
 

   
 
  
These results show that under its optimal solution, the monopoly have to keep the same change  
in stock in all dams by increasing its electricity production in the region with abundant water and 
decreasing production in the region with scarce water.    
The variation in stock in the dams depends on the net variation in flows in the two regions. If 
0jF    , that is i jF F   ,  then , 1 0j td s     , 1 0i td s    and if 0 iF     that is 
i jF F   ,  then , 1 0j td s     , 1 0i td s   .
9
 
To analyze the effect of risk aversion on total production, we compare the variation in total 
production with and without risk aversion. We have: 
                                                 
9
 In the case where the average variation in flows of the two dams is not identical,  i jF F   , the monopoly 
assumes additional storage costs in the two dams. The more   increases, the higher these costs. In the particular case 
where 0    i jF F   , the total effect on hydropower production in regions i and j is i iq F    and 
j iq F   . In this case as well, the operator must satisfy electricity demand through additional pumping from the 
reservoir in the region with abundant water and reduce its production in the region with scarce water. To smooth the 
effects of this fluctuation of flows on electricity prices, it must ensure that this additional storage in the region with 
scarce water equalizes the additional discharge in the region with abundant water:
it jtq q   . 
10 
 
 
   
2
20 0
2
2 2
M M
t t
A A
A
Q Q
n b A nb
 
   

  
   
 
.  
This implies that 0  , 
0 0
M M
t tA A
Q Q
 
   if i jF F   ,  and 
0 0
M M
t tA A
Q Q
 
   if i jF F   . 
This result shows that when the operator is risk neutral and the net flow of precipitation is 
positive (negative), the increase (decrease) in total production of the two regions is greater than 
when the operator is risk averse.   
3.2 Case of abundant water in regions i and j 
We denote the gap between the variation in the refilling speed of dam j and that of region i by  :  
j iF F      with i jF F    . Then,   
  
 
 
 
2 2
2 2
2 2 2
2 2
it i
n b A b A
q F
n b A n b A
   
   
   
   
   
 (13) 
  
 
 
 
2 2
2 2
2 2 2
2 2
jt j
n b A b A
q F
n b A n b A
   
   
   
   
   
 (14) 
Proposition 1 
In the case where the hydropower producer observes an increase in the average flow of 
precipitation in the two regions i and j ( 0iF  and 0jF  ), he decides to perform: 
 additional pumping (storage) at the dam in region i (  0itq   ) if   jF     
 additional pumping (storage) at the dam in region j   0jtq    if   iF      
 additional pumping at the dams in regions i and j  0  0it jtq et q     if i jF F        
With 
  
  
2
2
2 2
0 1
1 2
n b A
n b A
 

 
  
  
  
. 
11 
 
The proof of proposition 1 follows from equations (13) and (14). 
The additional discharge in the two regions due to abundant water is given as: 
  
 
 
2
2
2 2
0
2i j
F it F jt i j
n b A
discharge q q F F
n b A
 
 
 
  
       
 
.  
Whereas the additional storage of water is evaluated at: 
 
 
 
2
2
2
0
2j i
F it F jt i j
b A
storage q q F F
n b A

 


        
 
.  
In this case we have: storage discharge   . In other words, in the case of abundant water in both 
regions, the additional inter-annual transfer of water from period t to period t+1 is less than its 
additional use at period t. Further, the analysis of the effects of the risk aversion coefficient show 
that 
 
0
storage
A
 


 and 
 
0
discharge
A
 


. These results are summarized by proposition 2.
10
 
 
Proposition 2 
In the case of abundant water in regions i and j  0iF   and 0jF  , the hydroelectricity 
producer uses two hydropower reservoirs to satisfy current demand for electricity. However, it 
should not fully use additional recharge to satisfy current demand for electricity   
  
 
 
2
2
2 2
2
i j
n b A
F F
n b A
 
 
   
  
  
 
, but instead should store a quantity 
 
 
 
2
2
2 2
2
i j
b A
F F
n b A

 

 
 
 
of potential energy in the form of water to satisfy future demand. Further, the greater the 
hydroelectric operator’s risk aversion, the larger the quantity of water stored for future demand. 
 
                                                 
10
 In the case of a water shortage in regions i and j, we obtain the opposite results to those found in this section. 
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4 Dam management under an oligopolistic structure with symmetric attitude toward risk   
In this section, we consider an electricity industry with an oligopolistic structure, with n firms 
that compete a la Cournot. The profit of hydroelectric firm i  in period t  is written as:  
 
2
, , , , , 1
1 2
n
i t i t i t i t i t
i
P q q s s

 

 
   
 
       (15) 
At each period t, hydroelectric operator i  maximizes the expected utility of its profit with a utility 
function characterized by constant absolute risk aversion identical for all hydroelectric operators 
 i jA A A  . The objective function of firm i is therefore: 
     
2 2 2
1 / 2
2
n
i it jt it t it it it
j i
W a b q q q E s s A q

 

  
        
  
  (16) 
The solution to the problem of maximization gives us equilibrium production of the dynamic 
Cournot closed-loop game of firm i (see Technical Appendix A2): 
   
    
2 2
2 2 1
i j
j i
it
a A b A nb F b F
q
A b A b n
     
   

     

    

 (17) 
In the case where the hydroelectric dams are independent and are in the same region 
 i jF F F  , hydroelectric production of firm i in period t is reduced to  2 1it
a F
q
A b n

 


  
. 
Therefore, 
  
  
2
2
2
1
1
it
a F b n Aq
b n A

  
   

   
. This shows that the increase in storage costs motivates 
producer i to deviate from its equilibrium strategy by additional pumping of its current stock if 
and only if the average recharge speed of dam i is markedly higher than the water release rhythm 
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from dam i in period t (case of strong hydraulicity), 0s  . Conversely, the operator must 
perform additional storage in the case of low water levels 0s  11. Further, from (17):  
 
  
22
2
0
1
it
a F Aq
A b n

  

  
   
   
Any increase in risk level reduces production of firm i in period t when all hydroelectric operators 
have the same average flow of precipitation. Lastly, all increases in the risk aversion rate of firm i 
reduce the immediate use of water, that is it favors an inter-temporal transfer of water from t 
to t+1. 
 
  
2
2
2
0
1
it
a Fq
A A b n
 
 

  
   
  
Hydroelectricity producer i’s production at period t depends positively on its inflow rates and 
negatively on the sum its competitor’s flow of precipitation. Total equilibrium hydroelectric 
production at period t is written as: 
 
    
2
1
2 2 1
n
i
iC
t
A b na F
Q
A b A b n
  
   

 
   
 
    

 (18) 
4.1 Case of water abundance in region i and scarcity in region j 
In this case, the hydroelectric producer in region i observes an increase in its average flow of 
precipitation  0iF  , whereas the hydroelectric producer in region j observes an average 
                                                 
11
 We have  0it
q


 

 if     21a F b n A       and      
21a F b n A F q         . Also, 
   0F q s     . Therefore,  0it
q


 

 if  0s   .  
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decrease in its flows  0jF  . The average flow is presumed constant in regions other than i and 
j.  Let   be the gap between variation in the recharge rate of dam i and that in dam j:
j iF F      with j iF F    . The total effect of the variation of average recharge inflow 
in the two regions on production of hydroelectric dams i and j is: 
      2 2 2
0
1
it i
b
q F
b A b A b n A
 
     
    
      
  (19) 
      2 2 2
0
1
jt j
b
q F
b A b A b n A
 
     
    
      
 (20) 
We therefore deduce that the hydroelectricity producer in the region with abundant water must do 
additional pumping, and inversely the hydroelectricity producer in the region with scarce water 
must do additional storage. In the case where 
j iF F     0  , additional pumping in the 
region with abundant water corresponds to additional storage in the region with a water shortage 
 jt itq q   . Based on (19) and (20),  the impact of variation of the average water inflows  on 
the variation of stock in the dams of regions i and j is: 
      
2
1 2 2 21
it i
b A b
d s F
b A b A b n A
 
     


   
      
 (21) 
      
2
1 2 2 21
jt j
b A b
d s F
b A b A b n A
 
     


   
      
 (22) 
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Proposition 3 
In the case where the hydroelectric operators in regions i and j observe an increase in the 
average flow of precipitation in region i and a decrease in average flow in region j¨ 0iF   and 
0jF  , we have: 
(i) A decrease in the stock of water in the dams in regions i and j  1 0itd s    and 
1 0jtd s    if j jF F     . 
(ii) A decrease in the stock of water in the dams in region j and an increase in the 
stock of water in the dam of region i  1 0itd s    and 1 0jtd s    if 
j iF F      . 
(iii) A decrease in the stock of water in the dams of regions i and j  1 0itd s    and 
1 0jtd s    if i iF F     .  
with 
    
    
2 2
2 2
1
0 1
1
b A b n A
b A b n A b
  

   
   
  
    
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The proof of proposition 3 follows from equations (21) and (22). 
Proposition 3 specifies the conditions under which, in a structure of imperfect competition, the 
possibility of storing electricity  in the form of water may motivate hydroelectric operators to 
manage their water resources strategically according to the relative scarcity of  water inflows in 
the dams. Case (i) is that of two dams situated in regions where the average abundance of water 
resources in the dam of hydroelectricity producer i does not compensate for the average scarcity 
in the dam of hydroelectricity producer j. In this case, the two hydroelectric operators benefit 
from deviating from their equilibrium strategy by performing additional pumping in the two 
regions. Despite the shortage of water in region j, hydroelectricity producer j knows that its 
competitor does not have sufficient additional water resources to play strategically against it on 
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the electricity market. Hydroelectricity producer j consequently performs strategic pumping in its 
own dam despite its water shortage.  
Condition (ii) is that of a dam of hydroelectricity producer j, which suffers from a shortage 
whereas the dam of hydroelectricity producer i experiences an increase in average water inflows. 
In this case, the abundance of inflows prompts the hydroelectricity producer to play strategically 
on the electricity market against hydroelectricity producer j, which suffers from a severe water 
shortage, by doing additional storage of this positive variation of its water inflows: this 
corresponds to strategic water storage. By additional pumping despite the scarcity of its water 
resources, producer j exacerbates its situation.  
Under condition (iii), the hydroelectric operators increase additional storage in both dams when 
the gap between the variations in the average water inflows in region i and that in region j is less 
than the increase in average water inflows in the region with abundant water. In other words, in 
the case where the two dams are in two regions where the average abundance of water resources 
in the dam of hydroelectricity producer i can relatively compensate for the average scarcity in the 
dam of hydroelectricity producer j, the two players deviate from their equilibrium strategy by 
additionally reducing electricity production in both dams, i.e. the one with scarce water and the 
one with abundant water. The hydroelectricity producer with a water shortage, namely that in 
region j, knows that its competitor has not a sufficient increase in water inflows to play 
strategically against it. Because the water scarcity of hydroelectricity producer j is not severe 
relative to the water abundance of hydroelectricity producer i, then hydroelectricity producer j 
can respond to the strategic storage of hydroelectricity producer i by doing its own additional 
storage. 
The solutions of itq  and jtq  (equations (19) and (20)) let us deduce the impact of the variation  
of precipitation inflows on total  production  CtQ :  
  
    
2
2 2
1
1
C
t
A b n
Q
A b A b n
   
   
  
 
    
 (23) 
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The variation in total production of the two dams depends on the sign of  . If 0jF    , that is 
i jF F   , then 0
C
tQ   and if 0 iF   ; that is i jF F   ,  then 0
C
tQ  . In the case 
where the increase in average water inflows in region i is less than the average scarcity in dam j, 
then total equilibrium production decreases. In other words, the relative scarcity of water 
resources in the whole stock favors additional storage of water. Conversely, relative abundance of 
water favors additional pumping at all hydropower reservoirs. In both cases, regardless of the 
hydroelectric operators’ strategic behavior, the reservoirs will be operated with respect to merit 
order principle.  
The effect of the risk aversion coefficient on C
tQ (the impact of the variation of precipitation 
inflows on quantity) is not monotone. The sign of 
 CtQ
A
 

 is determined by the sign of  
          2 2 2 21 2 2 1 1A b A b n A b n A b n                    .  
4.2 Case of abundant water in regions i and j 
In this case, the hydroelectric operators in regions i and j observe an increase in the flow of 
precipitation  0jF   and 0iF  . Let us denote by   the gap between the variation in the 
recharge speed of dam j and that of region i:  
j iF F      with i jF F    . We then have:  
  
         
2
2 2 2 2
1
1 1
it i
A b n b
q F
A b A b n A b A b n
   
       
  
   
         
 (24) 
  
         
2
2 2 2 2
1
1 1
jt j
A b n b
q F
A b A b n A b A b n
   
       
  
   
         
 (25) 
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Proposition 4 
In the case where the hydroelectric operators in regions i and j observe an increase in the 
average flow of precipitation  0iF   and 0jF  , we have: 
(i) Additional pumping from the dam of region i and additional storage in the dam of 
region j  0itq   and 0jtq   if i iF F      . 
(ii) Additional pumping in the dams of regions i and j  0itq   and 0jtq   if 
i jF F       . 
(iii) Additional pumping from the dam of region j and additional storage in the dam of 
region i  0itq   and 0jtq   if j jF F     . 
with 
 
 
2
2
1
0 1
1
A b n
A b n b
 

 
  
  
   
. 
 
Proposition 4 states the conditions under which the possibility of storing electricity in the form of 
water, coupled with imperfect competition, can lead hydroelectric operators to manage their 
water resources strategically according to the relative abundance of water inflows in the dams. 
Under condition (i), hydropower operator i has a larger increase in average water inflows than 
that of hydroelectricity producer j. Because hydroelectricity producer i knows that the average 
increase in its water inflows can compensate for the gap in the variation of inflows in the two 
regions, he decides to do additional pumping on its dam. Consequently, hydroelectricity producer 
j can respond only by additional storage. In case (ii), hydropower operator i experiences an 
increase in its average water inflows that is slightly greater than that which occurs at the dam of 
hydroelectricity producer j. In this case, both hydroelectric operators do additional pumping. In 
case (iii), hydroelectricity producer j has a larger increase in its average inflows than that of 
hydroelectricity producer i. The relative abundance of water resources in the dam of 
hydroelectricity producer j compared with that of hydroelectricity producer i prompts operator i 
to increase its production, whereas hydroelectricity producer i will store its additional inflows.  
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5 Dam management under a duopolistic structure with asymmetric attitude toward risk 
In this section, we assume that the hydroelectricity producers do not have the same attitude 
toward risk (
i jA A ). Equilibrium electricity production under the Cournot Nash closed-
loop strategy is (see Technical Appendix A3): 
   
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The equilibrium strategy of hydroelectricity producer i at period t depends on several parameters 
including the risk aversion rates ,i jA A  and uncertainty of electricity demand 
2 . The sensitivity 
of a firm’s hydroelectric production relative to its competitor’s risk aversion coefficient is:   
    
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i i jit
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We have 0it
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. Therefore,  *
jA i
F  
represents the threshold at which the variation of the risk aversion coefficient of firm j has no 
effect on the water pumping strategy of hydroelectricity producer i at period t.  
In the case where the average inflows of the competing firm is below the threshold  *
jA i
F , all 
increases in the risk aversion coefficient of operator j leads producer i to deviate from its 
equilibrium strategy by performing additional storage of its current stock. However, this 
condition is possible only if the average inflow of dam j is slightly lower than that of dam i. If the 
relative weakness of the average water inflows in dam j is associated with an increase in the risk 
aversion coefficient of hydroelectricity producer j, hydroelectricity producer i will compete 
strategically by performing additional storage of its potential energy. The increase in 
jA  triggers 
raises the variability of the profit of producer j, which it must minimize through additional 
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decreases in equilibrium water pumping at dam j. Therefore, the additional gain from 
minimization of the variance of the profit of operator j does not offset the additional loss in that 
operator’s expected profit, and is compounded by its lower average water inflows. Consequently, 
operator j decides to store additional water. This additional storage increases the average 
electricity price and consequently augments the marginal gain on immediate use of a unit of water 
in the dam of competitor i, which has more abundant average inflow. To further increase its 
current gain, operator i decides to play strategically against its competitor by further lowering its 
production because it knows that hydroelectricity producer j cannot compete strategically against 
it on electricity wholesale market. In the opposite case, hydroelectricity producer i does additional 
strategic pumping of potential energy.
12
  
The sensitivity study of a firm’s production relative to the variation of its own risk aversion 
coefficient is:  
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Therefore, if producer i becomes more risk averse then he decides to reduce its equilibrium 
production at period t if and only if the average water inflows in its competitor’s dam is below the 
threshold of  *
iA i
F :  
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 However, in the case where average precipitation inflows is the same for both producers (
i jF F F  ), any 
increase in the competitor’s risk aversion coefficient always increases equilibrium hydroelectric production of firm i 
at period t:  
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In other words, when the increase in the risk aversion coefficient of hydroelectricity producer i 
coincides with a relative weakness in average water inflow in its competitor’s dam j, this favors 
additional storage by firm i. If hydroelectricity producer i is more risk averse, then additional 
reduction in water pumping from its dam at period t lets it minimize the variance of its profit. It 
can thus raise the expected utility of its profit following an increase in the average price of 
electricity at the current period. However, the marginal gain from the rise in price does not 
compensate for the marginal loss due to the increase in its risk aversion coefficient. 
Consequently, according to the first first-order condition (see the Technical appendix A3), the 
marginal gain from pumping an additional unit from the dam of hydroelectricity producer i at 
period t always remains below the marginal value of the same unit of water in stock; this favors 
additional storage in dam  i. In the case where the increase in risk aversion coefficient of producer 
i coincides with abundance in average water inflows in the dam of competitor j relative to dam i (
 
ij A i i
F F F   ), this favors additional water release by firm i at period t. Conversely, if the 
average precipitation inflows is the same for both producers (
i jF F F  ), then: 
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In other words, if hydroelectric operators have the same average water inflows, an increase in risk 
aversion coefficient for any operator reduces the equilibrium quantity of water pumped from its 
dam. Conversely, an increase in electricity demand uncertainty decreases water pumping in the 
dams: 
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An increase in the variance of electricity demand at a given period will not affect the expected 
instantaneous profit of hydroelectricity producer i. It has a positive effect uniquely on the 
variance of producer i’s profit and consequently favors a drop in expected utility of the total 
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profit of i. Given that hydroelectricity producer i must minimize the variance of its instantaneous 
profit, its only option is to reduce current water pumping. This additional storage of water, with 
all things being equal, lowers the average electricity price. However, the marginal gain from the 
drop in variance in instantaneous profit does not offset the marginal loss from the decline in 
expected profit. According to the condition of optimality, this creates a negative gap between the 
marginal income from immediate pumping of a unit of water from dam i and its in situ price, 
which justifies additional storage of water for future use.   
6 Conclusion 
In 2012, hydroelectricity supplied 16.3% of world electricity and in several countries, 
hydropower is the main source of electricity (e.g. Brazil, Norway, province of Quebec in Canada, 
New Zealand). And, because of its contribution to climate change mitigation, the share of 
hydroelectricity in total world electricity is expected to grow in the future decades (IPCC, 2014). 
Nonetheless, the economic literature has mainly analyzed the strategic behavior of electricity 
operators in purely thermal systems or mixed hydrothermal systems. Purely hydroelectric 
industries with large water storage capacities have attracted sparsely attention. In addition, little 
works have integrated risk dimension, which is quite salient for suppliers of hydropower. Water 
reserves are renewed randomly by precipitation and given the climate change phenomenon and 
the associated series of extreme events (IPCC, 2014), the challenge of optimal management of 
this resource over several periods of time has become more pressing. On the demand side, 
operators of hydroelectric plants are also facing several sources of uncertainty closely linked to 
different categories of electricity demands (residential, commercial and industrial). 
In this paper, we analyzed the problem of water resource management under two industrial 
structures, monopolistic and oligopolistic, when hydroelectricity producers are risk averse and face 
uncertainty on demands. Analytic resolution of the problem of dynamic stochastic optimization 
show how a monopoly can manage its hydropower reservoirs through additional pumping or 
storage depending on the relative abundance of water between regions to smooth the effect of 
uncertainty on electricity prices. In addition, risk aversion reduces the variation of water pumping 
when the net flow of precipitation is positive or negative.  
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Under oligopolistic competition with symmetric risk aversion, we have specified the 
conditions under which relative scarcity (abundance) of water in an operator’s dam can favor 
additional strategic pumping (storage) in its competitor’s dams. When the average abundance of 
water resources in the dam of operator does not compensate for the average scarcity in the dam of 
the other one, the two operators benefit from deviating from their equilibrium strategy by 
performing additional pumping in the two regions.  Conversely, when one producer suffers from a 
shortage whereas the other one experiences an increase in average water inflows, the second one 
plays strategically by doing additional storage. 
Under asymmetric risk aversion, we show that the hydroelectricity production of a firm 
increases in parallel with the risk aversion coefficient of its competitor if and only if the recharge 
speed of the competitor’s dam exceeds a certain level that increasingly depends on its average 
water inflows. If the two hydroelectric operators have the same average water inflows, an increase 
in risk aversion coefficient for any operator reduces the equilibrium quantity of water pumped from 
its dam. Conversely, an increase in electricity demand uncertainty decreases water pumping in the 
dams. 
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Technical Appendix 
A.1. Derivation of Monopoly solution 
The objective function of hydroelectric operator is: 
       
2 22 2
, , 1 , , 1
1 1
/ 2
2 2
n n
t t t t i t i t t t t i t i t
i i
W E a Q bQ s s A Var a Q bQ s s
 
  
 
   
          
   
   
With 
t it
i
Q q  , the total production of various hydroelectric dams. Assuming that precipitation 
flows of various dams are independent, we have:  
     
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The monopoly chooses the electricity production path   1,...,
1,...,
i nit
t
q 
 
by the n dams’ solution of 
dynamic and stochastic optimization problem with infinite horizon in following: 
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where  0 .E  is the conditional expectation to information available on the stock of water in 
various dams at initial period. The initial stock of each dam  0is  is known with certainty. The 
Lagrangian of this optimization problem is: 
       
2 2 2
0 1 1
0 1 1
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t it it t it it it it it
t i i
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where it represents the state co-variables associated to each stochastic dynamic constraint on 
the storage of water in the dam i. This problem admits one solution of finite value of the objective 
function (Sargent, 2001). The First order conditions relative to the production of dam i at period t,
itq , is : 
 2
1
: 2 0
n
it it it
i
q a b A q 

     (28) 
The first order conditions determining the level of water storage in the dam i at period t+1, 1its  is: 
     1 1 1 1 2:  0it t it it t it it t it its E E s s E s s               (29)   
Using the delay operator L , Euler's equation is written: 
   1 11 it it t itL Cms E Cms       
Where  1it t it itCms E s s    is the marginal cost of storage in the dam i at period t. After 
simplification, the solution of it is: 
 1
0
l
it it l t it l
l
Cms E Cms  

  

     (30) 
From  (30), the in situ price of a unit of potential energy stored in the dam i at period t ( it ) is 
equal to the discounted sum of the differences between the marginal cost at period t and the 
updated marginal cost at period t+1. Thus, in equilibrium, the producer must equalize the 
marginal value of water in stock at period t to the net marginal cost of inter-temporal transfer of 
electricity from period t to the following periods for later use. Thus, in each period t, 
hydroelectric operator does an inter-temporal trade-off between conservation and exploitation of 
a water’s unit in the dam of region i. If the marginal cost of storage is constant between periods 
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 it iCms Cms , the in situ price of a unit of potential energy stored in the dam i at period t also 
becomes constant  it i  and would be equal to the marginal cost of storage  i iCms  . 
Taking into account the dynamic equation of storage, Euler's equation gives: 
     1 1 1t it it t it it t it itE E q f E q f            
Replacing it  and 1it   by their expression, we obtain: 
            21 1 11 2it t it t it t it t t tq E q E f E f a b A Q E Q                 (31) 
for 1,...,i n . Making the sum for i, we obtain: 
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with  22n b A     . Using the properties on the delay operator L and by replacing (32) in 
(31), we obtain: 
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Using assumption of the random walk of the water inflows, the solution of itq is: 
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A.2. Derivation of the solution of the oligopoly model with an identical coefficients of risk 
aversion  
The Lagrangian of duopoly problem is: 
     
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where it represents the state co-variable associated with the stochastic dynamic constraint on 
the storage of water in the dam of the hydro producer i. First order conditions are: 
 2: 2 0
n
it it jt it
j i
q a b A q b q 
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Using recurrent equation on the dynamic of the stock, we have: 
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Replacing (34) in  (36), we obtain : 
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with 
22b A     .  We denote by:   
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Thereby, we obtain a system of reaction functions: 
1 1 1 , , ,it it t jt
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Solving this system gives the following solution: 
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With    1b b n         
Substituting 1itdq  , 1itZ  et 1jtZ  by theirs expressions in (15) and using the assumption of the 
random walk of the water inflows, we have,  
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This implies: 
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With  2H b n    
Using the delay operator L , we obtain: 
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After simplification, we obtain: 
 ( 1)
it i j
j i
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We replace , ,H    by theirs expressions, we get the production of the equilibrium closed-loop 
Cournot dynamic game of the hydro producer i: 
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A.3. Derivation of the solution of the duopoly model with different coefficients of risk 
aversion  
The Lagrangian of the maximization problem of firm  is : 
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The first order conditions are: 
 2: 2 0
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From recurrent equation on the dynamic of the stock and (43) we have: 
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Substituting (42) in (44) , we obtain: 
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With 22i ib A      
We denote by: 
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As the flow of precipitation follow a random walk, we have: 
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Thus, we obtain a system of reaction functions:  
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To simplify the analytical solution of this system of equations, we limit our analysis to the case of 
a hydroelectric duopoly ( 2n  ).Solving this system gives us as solution: 
1 1 1
1 1 1
it j i it jt
jt i j jt it
dq Z bZ
dq Z bZ
 
 
  
  
     

    
  (49) 
With 
2
i
i
i j b





and 
2
j
j
i j b





.  
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Replacing 1itZ  et 1jtZ  by theirs expressions in (49) and using the delay operator L , we obtain: 
     11 1it j i j
j
b
L q a F a F    


 
        
  
 
Whence,  
 it j i j
j
b
q a F a F  

 
      
  
 
Finally, replacing  
j  and j  by theirs expressions, the electricity production at equilibrium of 
the Nash Cournot closed-loop game is: 
   
  
2 2
2 2 2
2
2 2
j j i j
it
i j
b A a b A F bF
q
b A b A b
     
   
     

    
 
 
